Tag archives: Courts

Suicide Risk and Gender Transition: The Facts

by Jennifer Bauwens

July 23, 2021

As a graduate student in my early twenties, I volunteered on a suicide hotline. The calls I received while working on the hotline certainly included the suicidal person, but they also came from concerned family members, friends, and coworkers.  When advising people who wanted to keep someone safe, it was essential to give them tools not only to speak with the person of concern, but to also underscore that the person they seek to help has a choice in the matter.  Of course, the goal was to save lives, but we wanted to communicate to the helping party that, ultimately, they are not responsible for another person’s decision should their loved one choose to follow through with their threat of suicide.

While suicide is a very serious issue, it doesn’t mean that the helper should be controlled by the threat.  For example, after years of counseling with domestic violence survivors, I can recall countless stories of women who were told by an abusive spouse or partner, “if you leave me, I’ll commit suicide.”  Again, suicidal thoughts and gestures should be assessed and evaluated, and underlying causes need to be properly addressed. However, tying such requests to expressions of suicide can prove to be, in some cases, controlling. That’s what I communicated to domestic violence survivors who felt demands placed on them to sacrifice their safety, and in some instances, their lives, because of the threats expressed by the person abusing them.      

Unfortunately, the “threat” of suicide is what is being used against responsible leaders trying to protect children from harmful and often unknown risks associated with gender transition procedures. In the wake of the news that a federal judge in Arkansas blocked that state’s Save Children from Experimentation Act (which would protect children from receiving unnecessary and invasive medical interventions aimed at treating a psychological condition characterized by confusion over one’s biological sex) from going into effect, we’ve seen a resurgence in claims of the risk of suicide, without reference or examination to a range of likely underlying and co-occurring conditions.

When appealing to the judge several days ago to temporarily enjoin Arkansas’ law, Chase Strangio of the ACLU claimed: “These families, like hundreds of others across the state, are terrified … There has already been a spike in suicide attempts since this legislation was passed.” Court filings read: “For some transgender youth, the prospect of losing this critical medical care, even before the legislation is in effect, is unbearable … In the weeks after the bill passed, at least six transgender adolescents in Arkansas attempted suicide.” 

Within the ACLU’s claims, there is no reference to the other factors that might affect these adolescents’ decisions to attempt suicide. We are simply led to believe that legislative decisions alone are prompting suicidal thoughts in these teenagers.

Similar assertions implying that this legislation will only increase the risk of suicide were sprinkled throughout other’s reports on the issue.  Some involved in the case went on to argue that these medical practices “save lives” and are necessary for the transgender population that tends to be vulnerable to depression and suicide.

The high suicide rate in the transgender identifying population, in fact, has been repeatedly given as the reason to support treatments that stop puberty in developing children, to start kids on a lifetime supply of the opposite-sex’s hormones, and to allow surgeries that remove healthy sexual organs. These claims are misplaced, and frankly, dangerous.

That said, suicide is a real threat, and it should be addressed. The underlying causes that are leading to this threat should also be investigated so that this population can be properly treated. But, at this time, there is no evidence that suicidality abates after transgender medical procedures are performed. To the contrary, the available evidence shows a rise in completed suicides following medical interventions. Why? Clearly, the real psychological pain behind the suicidality is not being addressed by medical interventions.

The problem here is that suicide should never be used as a tool, by any group, to strong-arm policymakers and the psychological and medical communities into both allowing and providing questionable practices that have somehow gained a monopoly on “standards of care” for gender dysphoria.  Especially when those practices involve onboarding children, who have not fully developed physiologically, psychologically, and neurologically, to potentially irreversible and sterilizing treatments. 

In response, public policy makers should focus on protecting citizens, particularly vulnerable children. Further, policies that inform public health and safety should be firmly grounded in solid empirical research, such as:

  • There is no evidence that transgender medical treatments reduce the psychological distress and mental health issues associated with gender dysphoria.
  • There is no long-term investigation into the psychological and physiological consequences of transgender medicine performed on children.

The credible and available evidence indicates:

  • There are significant health risks to transgender medicine. Some of these include cardiovascular disease, high blood pressure, diabetes, & blood clots.
  • In a 30-year longitudinal study, gender reassignment surgery patients had a 19 times higher rate of completed suicide than the general population.

A few known underlying conditions that are not addressed by transgender medicine:

  • A recent study showed 45 percent of transgender identifying persons experienced childhood sexual abuse.
  • Higher rates of substance abuse have been found in this population by comparison to the general population.

For more information on this topic, see FRC’s issue analysis.

Jennifer Bauwens is Director of the Center for Family Studies at Family Research Council.

Pennsylvania Court Delivers Two Pro-Life Victories

by Mary Szoch

March 31, 2021

This past week, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court issued a huge victory for all Pennsylvanians—born and unborn. In a 6-1 decision, the Commonwealth Court both upheld a 1985 Pennsylvania law stating that state taxpayer dollars could not be used for abortion except in the case of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother and ruled that “Reproductive Health Centers,” in this case, three Planned Parenthood affiliates and three stand-alone abortion clinics, “lack standing to initiate litigation to vindicate the constitutional rights of their patients enrolled in Medical Assistance.” The abortion businesses who were the plaintiffs in the case will appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The Commonwealth Court’s ruling is cause for celebration for several reasons. First, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the rights of Pennsylvanians to have a law prohibiting tax dollars for elective abortions. The 1985 law is essentially Pennsylvania’s version of the Hyde Amendment. This amendment, which passed in 1976, had overwhelming bipartisan support for over 40 years—including support as recent as 2019 from now President Joe Biden—but it is now under attack by Democrats and President Biden. Neither the 1985 Pennsylvania law nor the Hyde Amendment prohibit abortions—both simply state that taxpayer dollars will not be used to fund abortions.

The vast majority of Americans are supportive of this law. In fact, a 2020 Marist poll found that 60 percent of Americans, including 37 percent who identify themselves as pro-choice, oppose taxpayer funding of abortions. Americans recognize that taxpayers who correctly believe abortion is the killing of an innocent unborn baby should not be forced to pay for this practice. Hopefully, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will uphold this ruling and it will be repeated by other state supreme courts who face similar challenges from abortion providers.

Second, the court ruled that abortion businesses do not have standing to challenge a prohibition on taxpayer dollars paying for abortions. In doing so, the court recognized that the key stakeholders in a case regarding abortion are not businesses who stand to profit from the practice of abortion, but instead, pregnant women who intend to have an abortion. This is a major step in limiting the abortion industry’s exploitation of women in Pennsylvania. 

Under the Pennsylvania standard for standing, the Commonwealth Court ruled that they would be required to determine if patients “on whose behalf Reproductive Health Centers purport to speak even want this assistance.” Unfortunately, however, Pennsylvania has a different standard for standing than the federal government. As was seen in the Louisiana case June Medical vs. Russo, the Supreme Court has allowed abortion businesses to file lawsuits on behalf of the women they proport to serve. In doing so, the Supreme Court allowed Louisiana abortionists to continue to profit from putting the lives of women receiving abortions at risk—despite the abortionists’ inability to demonstrate that any affected women actually supported their position.

While the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court’s ruling is not indicative of how the United States Supreme Court would rule in such a case, and while it may be overturned by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for now, it is a pro-life victory. It is a ruling that recognizes the conscience rights of Pennsylvania taxpayers while limiting the ability of abortion businesses to speak for women. Pray that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upholds this ruling and that other states’ pro-life efforts are buoyed by this victory.

Family Research Council has developed a series of maps to help Americans understand their state’s abortion laws. To see where your state stands with regard to funding abortion businesses, click here.

Ninth Circuit Rules in Favor of the Protect Life Rule, Again

by Patrina Mosley , Connor Semelsberger, MPP

February 25, 2020

After a months-long legal battle, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (9th Circuit) ruled 7-4 that the Protect Life Rule, which separates federal Title X Family Planning funding from abortion facilities, can go into full effect.

In July 2019, an 11-judge panel sitting en banc in the 9th Circuit reinforced a decision that the Protect Life Rule could go into effect temporarily while the merits of the case against the rule filed by Planned Parenthood and several liberal states were argued. Since this July ruling, HHS has enforced this new rule which requires physical and financial separation between clinics that receive Title X funds for family planning services and facilities that perform abortions. It also prohibits physicians at Title X family planning clinics from referring patients for abortions.

Yesterday, the 9th Circuit finally ruled that the Protect Life Rule is constitutional and can go into full effect. This victory in the historically liberal 9th Circuit is a welcome sight and was made possible in part by the great work of President Donald Trump and the U.S. Senate to confirm 51 federal appeals court judges, including two 9th Circuit judges who took part in yesterday’s ruling. However, it would not be a surprise if Planned Parenthood and the other plaintiffs decided to appeal this ruling all the way to the Supreme Court, but even at the highest court in the land there is precedent for the Protect Life Rule to be upheld. In 1991 in Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court upheld similar regulations governing Title X finalized under President Ronald Reagan. The decision in Rust was a crucial part of the opinion issued by the 9th Circuit yesterday, and suggests a similarly favorable outcome should this case reach the Supreme Court.

For far too long, the people’s tax dollars have been entangled with the abortion industry. Trump’s “gag rule” only gags the dishonesty and lack of integrity that has been taking place for decades, so ultimately the court’s decision to uphold the restrictions is a win for life and a win for women.

Under the Protect Life Rule, abortion is no longer considered to be “health care” or “family planning.” Abortion-performing entities like Planned Parenthood, who have decided not to comply with the new Title X restrictions, have by default opened up more opportunities for life-affirming health care centers like federally qualified health centers (FQHCs) and Obria, which provide even more services to women than Planned Parenthood.

To see a list of the Grantees who voluntarily withdrew from Title X grant awards, see our blog here.

As a result of restoring integrity to the Title X regulations, there will be an increased diversity of health care providers available for women to choose from in the federal family planning program, and the taking of innocent life will no longer be accepted as “family planning” in America.

The Tenth Circuit’s Kitchen v. Herbert Flubs Fundamental Rights Analysis

by Chris Gacek

June 26, 2014

Yesterday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a federal district court’s decision striking down the definition of marriage found in Utah’s constitution. That definition limited Utah marriages to the union of one man and one woman. It was approved by referendum in November 2004 with 65.9% of the vote. In Kitchen v. Herbert, a 2-1 majority court struck down that definition by concluding, among other things, that there is a fundamental right to enter into a same-sex marriage. There is much more to the decision, but this note will focus on this key aspect of opinion.

As the U.S. Supreme Court instructed in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees more than fair process. It “also provides heightened scrutiny against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Id. at 720. But, how does one determine what rights and interests are “fundamental?” Glucksberg is the key case in setting forth the constitutional law in this area.

Paul Linton summarized the Glucksberg standard in the Family Research Council’s amicus brief in Kitchen (pp. 3-5) (edits to text, notes, and citations have been made below):

In determining whether an asserted liberty interest (or right) should be regarded as fundamental for purposes of substantive due process analysis under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment[] (infringement of which would call for strict scrutiny review), the Supreme Court applies a two-prong test. First, there must be a “careful description” of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). Second, the interest, so described, must be firmly rooted in “the Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.” Id. at 710. ….

As in other cases asserting fundamental liberty interests, it is necessary to provide a “careful description” of the fundamental liberty interest at stake. For purposes of substantive due process analysis, therefore, the issue here is not who may marry, but what marriage is. The principal defining characteristic of marriage, as it has been understood in our “history, legal traditions, and practices,” is the union of a man and a woman. Properly framed, therefore, the issue before this Court is not whether there is a fundamental right to enter into a marriage with the person of one’s choice, but whether there is a right to enter into a same-sex marriage. ….

This is the point at which the majority opinion runs off the rails. It dodges the hard edge of Glucksberg requiring a tight, accurate definition of the claimed right. The Kitchen court goes in another direction asserting baldly (p. 35), “But we cannot conclude that the fundamental liberty interest in this case is limited to the right to marry a person of the opposite sex.” They cannot do so because they will not to do so.

Of course, there is a fundamental right to marry a person of the opposite sex. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967). And, homosexuals are not precluded from marrying in any state. But, what is this national debate about? It is about the definition of marriage. Homosexual men and women assert that the laws of over thirty states should be nullified because, among other things, there is a fundamental right to marry members of the same sex. Furthermore, all states must be compelled to recognize male-male and female-female marriages.

Returning to the Glucksberg test it is manifestly clear that there is no such fundamental right, for it must be deeply embedded in “the Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.” How can this be possible with the claimed fundamental right to same-sex marriage? There is nothing about it that is firmly grounded in this country’s history, legal tradition, and practices. There were no same-sex marriages anywhere in the United States until the 21st Century.

Google is older than same-sex marriage.

There is a Supreme Court case that is instructive here, and it is Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). Much blood in the same-sex marriage debate has been spilled over this case. In Baker, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from a decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court which had rejected arguments for same-sex marriage similar to those being considered presently in our courts. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).

The U.S. Supreme Court declined the invitation to consider the matter stating that there was a “want of a federal question.” It has been argued that Baker precludes lower federal courts from even considering these issues, but federal courts have brushed aside those arguments, especially in the post-Windsor environment. It should be noted that the dissenting judge in Kitchen did accept this argument. Judge Kelly would have dismissed the case and left it for the U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether it wanted to revisit this area of the law. That seems like the correct approach.

Laying aside the argument that Baker requires a dismissal by lower courts, Baker is highly instructive in answering whether any claimed right to same-sex marriage is “fundamental.”

In 1972, the fundamental right argument was presented to the U.S. Supreme Court, and it was rejected – as it had been in Minnesota. Because Glucksberg tells us that fundamental rights must be rooted in our nation’s legal history and traditions, such a right should have been extant only forty-two years ago when the Supreme Court considered the Baker appeal. Fundamental right questions are dyadic – you either have one, a 0, or not, a 1. Baker gives us the Supreme Court’s answer in 1972: 0. Both courts had the constitutional issues presented in a manner we would recognize today. The Minnesota Supreme Court quoted Loving noting “there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex.” Baker, 291 Minn. at 315 (concluding the court’s equal protection analysis and discussing Loving).

Thus, the Baker Court had the core legal concepts and precedents before it that we now routinely see in same-sex marriage litigation (e.g., fundamental rights claim, arguments based on Loving), and it dismissed the appeal.

Of course, there are equal protection arguments to also consider, but one must reasonably conclude that the Kitchen majority’s fundamental rights analysis fails badly. This point is underscored by footnote 4 of the FRC amicus brief in Kitchen which provides a lengthy list of courts that have rejected the argument that any fundamental rights (Due Process) analysis supports the claims of the Utah plaintiffs challenging the state’s natural marriage definition.

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